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Abstract
Prosecutorial accountability mechanism for wrongful 
cases will encourage legal handling of cases and ensure 
judicial justice. Despite the problems emerging in the 
process of prosecution, such as misapprehensions of 
arrests that do not result in criminal charges and of 
releases after a series of prosecutorial procedures, we 
cannot risk abolishing the mechanism that holds involving 
prosecutors liable for their mistakes and misconduct in 
wrongful cases, but endeavor to improve in ways that 
define wrongful cases, prosecutorial accountability and 
immunity from prosecutorial mistakes. 
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Prosecutorial accountability mechanism for wrongful 
cases is at the center of judicial accountability, the most 
stubborn part in judicial reform. The future of judicial 
reform will be largely determined by whether this 
prosecutorial accountability mechanism is put in place. 
According to the Decision of the CPC Central Committee 
on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively 
Promoting the Rule of Law (hereinafter referred to as 
the Decision), approved in the Fourth Plenary Session 
of the 18th CPC Central Committee, all prosecutors will 
be liable for their performance of duties in case handling 
for life and be disciplined in a bottom-up manner within 
the judicial system if any mistakes or misconduct are 
found in the cases they have handled. In fact, the topic 
of prosecutorial accountability mechanism for wrongful 
cases is mostly discussed from the perspective of judges 
rather than prosecutorial officials. This paper is an attempt 
to deal with the questions arising from this accountability 
mechanism in the current judicial system from the 
perspective of prosecutorial officials and figure out the 
ways that might contribute to the improvement of the 
judicial system in legal practice.
1 .  D I S P U T E D  P R O S E C U T O R I A L 
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM
To frame and promote prosecutorial accountability for 
wrongful cases, China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
publ ished Opinions  on  Improving the  Judic ia l 
Accountability System of the People’ Procuratorates 
(hereinafter referred to as the Opinions). Chapter 6 of 
the Opinions has provided clear definitions as to when 
prosecutors shall assume judicial liability for their 
mistakes and misconduct in wrongful cases, underpinning 
the practice of prosecutorial accountability. But some 
scholars have been questioning and criticizing the idea 
of prosecutorial accountability for wrongful cases and 
even proposed the abolishment of the mechanism with the 
following reasons. 
First, there is no theoretical foundation or clear 
standards to support the defining of prosecutorial mistakes 
and misconduct in wrongful cases, and there is the 
absence of a set of universal standards that define the 
party that leads the examination, the procedure that such 
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examination needs to go through and the content that 
needs to be examined. Such accountability mechanism 
is not strongly grounded. (Wang, 2018) In addition, 
the current prosecutorial accountability mechanism is 
based on internal supervision., which might encourage 
minimizing and denying problems within prosecutorial 
organs. If so, this goes completely against the purpose 
of the mechanism. Extreme ideas even show that the 
mechanism itself represents a lack of confidence in 
China’s current judicial branch. (Liao, 1999)
Second, different from administrative power and 
judicial power, prosecutorial power is executed to start 
a legal proceeding for the settlement of a substantial 
issue. It is, in nature, procedural and does not carry any 
weight of substantive punishment. (Zhu & Zhang, 2010) 
Among many, prosecutors’ decision not to initiate a 
public prosecution is the only kind of judicial power that 
resembles judicial power, while others are practiced to 
initiate a proceeding instead of giving final judgment 
on the substantive facts of a case. It is illogical to hold 
prosecutors, who are no authority of finality of case 
judgment as judges, accountable for mistakes occurring 
in cases. Such mechanical transplant of accountability 
mechanism will damage the sense of honor and mission 
of all prosecutor officials and might hinder the further 
betterment of China’s judicial system. 
Last, public security, prosecutorial organs and 
courts are all involved in some major wrongful criminal 
convictions and criminal cases. In these situations, 
mistakes and misconduct by police, prosecutors and 
judges all combines to make a wrongful conviction. (Li, 
2007) That means the hindrance of mistakes from any 
of these three branches will work to prevent a wrongful 
conviction. Judges are responsible for determining 
the facts and applicable laws of a case, so they are the 
ones that will be held accountable if their work leads 
to a wrongful conviction. In this case, liability is easy 
to tell. Comparatively, it is never clear who is or are 
responsible for a wrongful case from the perspective of 
the prosecutorial officials, which include prosecutors, 
deputy chief prosecutors in charge, chief prosecutors, 
officials from prosecutorial committees and in certain 
cases departments responsible for the investigation and 
supervision of public security organs, public prosecution 
and the prosecution of prosecutorial organs and even 
multiple tiers of procuratorates. It is challenging to strike 
a balance between prosecutorial power and responsibility 
and the responsibilities between different parties involved. 
(Li, 2016) Under the current duet model, both arrest and 
prosecution are dealt with by the same teams. This way 
of case handling has brought difficulties in accountability 
identification for individual prosecutors. 
As far as we are concerned, these three viewpoints 
are partially grounded, yet have figured out some of the 
problems in prosecutorial accountability for wrongful 
cases. However, they do not suffice to abolish the 
prosecutorial accountability mechanism, which is still 
indispensable in ensuring judicial justice as well as better 
shaping prosecutorial officials and their behavior. 
The first reason is that there are clear, plausible 
standards to determine prosecutorial mistakes and 
misconduct in wrongful cases. In practice, case results 
tend to be misunderstood as the focus, which leads to 
ambiguity of related conceptions. The fact is it is the 
prosecutorial misconduct that the mechanism focuses 
on rather than the case itself. (Wang, 2005) According 
to Article 32 of the Opinions, a prosecutor shall assume 
judicial liability for the performance of prosecutorial 
duties and be liable for the quality of case handled for life 
within the scope of his or her duties. Article 34 and Article 
35 also give clear statements about the situations that 
require judicial liability. Any misconduct falling into these 
categories will induce judicial liability. Thus, the idea 
that the standards for determining prosecutorial mistakes 
and misconduct in judicial cases do not exist is untrue. 
As evidenced in actual cases, prosecutors are immune 
from being sued for their mistakes in wrongful cases, 
but they are normally disciplined for their infringement 
of rules. This proves that accountability mechanism for 
prosecutorial mistakes and misconduct is practicable. (Li, 
2016)
This accountability mechanism is also in line with 
China’s national reality. Some people propose an 
emulation of the Anglo-American legal systems where 
prosecutors are disciplined for their misconduct only and 
walk away unscathed from the wrongful convictions that 
they should be responsible for. Others believe that the 
accountability mechanism should focus much more on 
prosecutors’ misconduct rather than the consequences 
caused. In our point of view, a complete adoption of 
the disciplinary mechanism from the Anglo-American 
legal systems is not plausible based on China’s current 
conditions. On one hand, under the national statute laws, 
prosecutors shall act in accordance with laws, and the 
results of the cases they handle are subject to China’s 
legal culture and statute laws that both attach great 
importance to facts. In this case, the supervision and 
management of judicial officials especially prosecutors 
might be diverted away from normal courses or totally 
absent if prosecutorial misconduct is addressed but case 
results are not examined, which runs completely against 
the purpose of statute laws. On the other, it is still a 
long way ahead for all the judicial officials to become 
professional and sophisticated, because the relatively 
undemanding threshold of legal profession has resulted in 
a group of judicial officials of varying levels. Under the 
policy of the Four Prosecutions – criminal prosecution, 
civil prosecution, administrative prosecution and 
public interest litigation – prosecutorial accountability 
mechanism underpins prosecutorial development as one 
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of the disciplinary mechanisms. Moreover, substantive 
justice is highlighted in legal practice, so it will 
undoubtably be inconvincible and unacceptable at least 
for the citizens who have faith in the country’s legal 
system if substantive results are not set as a standard 
for the examination of case results. The immunity that 
prosecutors enjoy from being sued for their mistakes in 
wrongful cases will fail to provide emotional comfort for 
the victims and damage the authority and justice of the 
procuratorates.  
The last is the prosecutorial accountability mechanism 
is conducive to promoting the sense of responsibility 
among the prosecutorial officials. Wrongful cases brought 
by either judicial corruption or judicial injustice will 
definitely undermine the authority of laws. That’s why it 
is urgent and significant to ensure the quality of judicial 
outcomes from the system itself. On the bright side, 
the mechanism will encourage prosecutors to perform 
their duties in a way that consolidate the legitimacy 
of investigation and arrest as well as restore personal 
freedom and reputation of the victims affected by 
wrongful cases in a shorter period of time.
2 .  M I S U N D E R S T A N D I N G S  O F 
PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
A workable, effective mechanism of prosecutorial 
accountability for wrongful cases will a driving force for 
judicial system reform. However, the misunderstandings 
of prosecutorial accountability in legal practice make it 
challenging for prosecutors to draw a clear line between 
prosecutorial power and liability. 
2.1 Release Without Prosecution
Release without prosecution comes from the situation 
where a procuratorate, after a series of examination, 
decides to release a suspect who is arrested during case 
investigation. Many prosecutorial officials are held 
accountable for cases that are mistaken as mishandled 
ones because suspects involved are freed without charges. 
This actually demonstrates a mix-up of the criteria for 
arrest and for prosecution where prosecution is mistaken 
as the measure of the legitimacy of arrests. 
In fact, there are obvious differences between the 
criteria for arrest and that for prosecution. The evidence 
accumulated in support of the arrest of a suspect does 
not necessarily suffice for prosecution. Reversely, a 
decision not to prosecute after examination cannot prove 
that the prior arrest is groundless. Both releases without 
prosecution and prosecution without arrest are existent in 
real cases, especially with the latter in great number. (Qiu 
& Liu, 2019) Exceptions are false arrests resulted from 
intentional acts or culpable negligence that prosecutorial 
officials should be held liable for, even though they do not 
have follow-up prosecution.  
2.2 Not-guilty Verdicts
In reality, most procuratorates are intolerant of not-guilty 
verdicts.  (Zhang  & Zhang, 2014) Any case ending up 
with a not-guilty verdict will be identified as a wrongful 
one, for which prosecutorial officials involved will 
have to assume liabilities. Under this circumstance, 
not-guilty verdicts made by courts are mistaken as the 
standard to measure the performance of prosecutors in 
public prosecution. It is another mix-up of criteria, this 
time, for prosecution and for not-guilty verdicts. The 
consequence is it might have run against the criteria for 
not-guilty verdicts or Article 12 of the Criminal Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, which says no 
person shall be found guilty without being judged so by a 
people’s court in accordance with the law. 
The way that cases with not-guilty verdicts are 
included as an evaluation of prosecutorial performance has 
enormously disrupted the independence of prosecutorial 
power. The reason is this will encourage prior information 
exchanges between case prosecutors and courts, especially 
when the courts hint at making a guilty verdict, before an 
official prosecution is established. By doing so, the ratio 
of not-guilty verdicts is expected to go down, if possible, 
to zero. 
According to Article 200 of China’s Criminal 
Procedure Law – if the defendant cannot be found guilty 
for insufficient evidence, the collegial panel shall render 
an acquittal sentence stating that the charges are denied 
for insufficient evidence – not-guilty verdicts due to 
insufficient evidence cannot be deemed as false criminal 
cases. Otherwise, it will be the adjudication process itself 
that needs correction, which runs counter to the goal of 
judicial advancement. (Zhang & Zhang, 2014)
Another point is that dismissed cases are not 
necessarily wrongful cases. In nature, dismissed cases 
are categorized into two types. The first type are those 
with obvious mistakes, such as mixing up the constitutive 
elements of a crime, such as the amount of money 
involved. The other are disputed cases with minor errors, 
whose judgment and liability identification require 
tremendous prudence. 
2.3 State Compensation
State compensation for justice miscarriages is another 
way of misunderstanding prosecutorial accountability. 
It is presented in two perspectives. The first is state 
compensation for citizens wrongfully convicted in 
judicial cases is mistaken for the standards of wrongful 
convictions, while the other is prosecutors involved 
enjoys impunity once the victims have benefitted from the 
national compensation program. 
As far as we are concerned, state compensation and 
prosecutorial accountability differentiate not only in who 
is in charge, who is targeted and what is to be delivered, 
but also their purposes, functions and ways of doing. 
Specifically, state compensation is aimed to negotiate 
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a compensational settlement between the state and its 
aggrieved citizens, while prosecutorial accountability 
is a means to ensure prosecutors’ performance of duties 
within the procuratorates they serve. As shown from 
legal practice, the two coincide in certain conditions. For 
instance, cases involving confessions by torture or death 
by intentional assault will be determined as wrongful 
cases, for which prosecutors engaged will be held 
accountable. Defendants in this kind of cases are entitled 
to receive compensation from the national government. 
2.4 Unclear Accountability
In most cases, major decisions are confirmed in the name 
of the chief prosecutors after made to the superiors or 
settled by a team of prosecutorial officials. The problem 
is individual prosecutors are unwilling to assume liability 
for a group decision. As such, prosecutors tend to avoid 
complicated cases, report to superiors and make them all 
the way to prosecutorial committees for final discussion. 
With these protective strategies, many prosecutors have 
fallen into a vicious circle where they fail to advance 
their capabilities in case handling and will not undertake 
challenging cases beyond their ability. (Chu & Duan, 2018)
In reality, cases have to go through three tiers of 
examination respectively by case prosecutors, head of the 
department and chief prosecutors. All of the prosecutorial 
officials dealing with the same case will undertake joint 
liability if the case is determined as a false one. But 
reality is that usually only the officials responsible for 
the first tier of examination will be disciplined. It is the 
superiors including the heads of the department, deputy 
chief prosecutors or chief prosecutors who make the final 
decisions. This is apparently a form of justice miscarriages 
and will not do justice to the mechanism of prosecutorial 
accountability. 
3 .  P R O M O T I O N  O F  E F F E C T I V E 
PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
To encourage prosecutors and give it full play for judicial 
justice, the mechanism of prosecutorial accountability 
in wrongful cases should be improved in the following 
aspects.
3.1 Definition of Wrongful Cases
Wrongful cases are broadly defined in the Opinions and 
its principles are not as workable as expected. Based on 
legal practice, the following two situations are where 
prosecutorial officials should be held liable for their 
misconduct in wrongful cases. 
Wrongful arrest. Wrongful arrest includes arrest 
of a person without proper cause that he/she committed 
a crime or of the wrong person and arrest without 
clear facts or sufficient evidence. As for cases where 
criminal suspects escape arrest for the mistakes of the 
procuratorates, prosecutors involved will be disciplined 
accordingly. This conforms to the standard of “rather 
release a wrong one than misjudge one”, which is also in 
line with what Mr. Shen Deyong tries to deliver, “innocent 
until proven guilty.” (Shen, 2013) 
Not to prosecute and wrongful prosecution. “Not to 
prosecute” refers to the situations where procuratorates 
decides not to prosecute criminal suspects who should 
have been held accountable in accordance with law. And 
“wrongful prosecution” mainly refers to the cases where 
criminal suspects are prosecuted before finally acquitted 
by the court. “Wrongful conviction is more harmful 
than wrongful release, because it violates the right of 
presumption of innocence.” (Zhang, et al, 1996) And 
cases where the court decides to change charges or reduce 
punishment after prosecution should not be deemed as 
wrongful. 
A wrongful case is constituted by four elements – 
prosecutors involved, intentional misconduct, severe 
consequences and law infringement. Prosecutors 
involving in a wrongful case are the ones who should 
assume liability for their intentional or major misconduct. 
If such blunders cause great damage to the victims, and 
have proven to be violation of law, including substantive 
laws and procedural laws, the cases that they are in charge 
can therefore be deemed as wrongful cases. In prosecution 
process, criminal law, criminal procedure law and relevant 
judicial interpretations and internal provisions of the 
prosecutorial organs are applicable. 
3.2 Clear Accountability 
In response to the blurry accountability lines and the 
leniency not to punish the majority, the principle that 
those who take charge and make decision will be held 
accountable for a wrongful case must be put in place. 
The responsibility for a wrongful case lies undoubtably 
with the individual prosecutor who is independently in 
charge of the case. And in cases handled by a team of two 
or more prosecutors, it should be determined according 
to the rules of procedure and division of functions once 
the case is deemed as a wrongful one. In cases where case 
prosecutor makes a decision in the name of the collective, 
he/she shall bear the responsibility. If it is a majority 
decision, the majority shall be held accountable for their 
misjudgment.
In cases that require the three-tier examination, or even 
discussion from prosecutorial committees, accountability 
lies clearly with those in charge and those who make 
decisions. First of all, if a wrongful case results from 
fraudulent identification of facts and evidence, the 
prosecutors who handle the case shall bear the responsibility 
for it. Second, if the head of the department changes the 
facts or evidence in the examination and verification of 
the case without authorization or under his/her instruction 
that results in the wrongful case, he/she shall assume full 
liability; Finally, if chief prosecutors make changes to the 
suggestions from the prosecutors in matters submitted 
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for decision, he/she shall be held accountable. It is 
unquestionable that chief prosecutors will not be liable for 
the issuance of a wrong case in respect of a decision made 
by the prosecutor within the scope of his functions and 
powers. In addition, if a decision made by a prosecutorial 
committee is identified as wrong, the committee members 
shall be held liable on the basis of whether there were 
intentional or gross errors in their opinions. 
3.3 Immunity and Accountability
According to Article 33 of the Opinions, prosecutors 
who have fulfill their responsibility will not be subject 
to disciplinary system despite minor mistakes in their 
work. This provision would enable “public officials 
such as prosecutors to exercise their particular functions 
and powers without worries and interference in a 
comprehensive and correct way.” (Chen, 2010) But it 
is too simple and general to be workable. Based on the 
combination of legal principle and legal practice, it should 
be perfected from the following aspects.
Give clear definition of immunity. Prosecutors can enjoy 
immunity if they fall into the following categories that 
do not result from any intentional culpable negligence – 
mistakes due to changes of facts or evidence, amendment to 
laws or updated judicial interpretation, or not-to-prosecute 
decision or acquittal caused by disagreement on applicable 
laws due to the ambiguity of legal provisions. Exceptions 
are major mistakes resulted from fraudulent statements 
intentionally by the parties involved. 
Define the burden of proof in duty performance. Article 
33 of the Opinions defines reasonable duty performance 
as full fulfillment of duty of care without intentional 
purpose or major faults, while its burden of duty is absent. 
Prosecutorial officials will enjoy immunity if they can 
prove their reasonable performance of duty. However, 
self-proving evidence do not suffice to ensure justice and 
fairness in prosecution and might easily get the case into 
a vicious circle of repeated appeals and responses. Under 
this circumstance, procuratorates shall provide evidence if 
any of their prosecutors fails in delivering reasonable duty 
performance, or otherwise announce their immunity from 
being sued. 
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